Um espetáculo triste esta manifestação no RIO sobre o petróleo.
Escancara-se a intenção em usar o petróleo como uma muleta para as mazelas da sociedade brasileira.
Entende-se a reação e o protesto do governo e da sociedade carioca. Como também é possível compreender os outros estados: todos são carentes em recursos.
Todo mundo grita e ninguém pensa.
Quando pensa, pensa no curto prazo. Os recursos do petróleo poderiam aliviar as crônicas deficiências do estado em saúde, infra-estrutura e segurança.
Puro engano.
O próprio IPEA mostra uma correlação entre escolaridade e qualidade de vida.
Todos os estudos do Banco Mundial, UNESCO e do próprio governo mostram que para um retorno em 15 anos o recurso melhor aplicado é na educação.
Mas não na educação via estado, ineficiente . Mas sim na educação voltada a meritocracia, onde os pais poderiam ativamente participar do processo de educação dos filhos.
O projeto CHEQUE EDUCAÇÃO foi apresentado no blog e propõe que a sociedade sem intermediação do estado use o recurso na escolha das melhores escolas (ou processos educacionais) para os filhos.
Isto eliminaria o tramite deste recurso por gabinetes, prefeituras, governos estaduais , com toda a ineficiência e corrupção que sabemos existir.
Mas isso não interessa a ninguém. Não mobiliza as massas. Não coloca 100 mil pessoas no centro do Rio.
A proposta CHEQUE EDUCAÇÃO é pura ingenuidade. Acreditar que alguém está realmente interessado em melhorar é um sonho ingênuo.
Vinicius Torres Freire na FSP de hoje sintetiza:
"Picotado pelo país, o dinheiro pode acabar nos escaninhos da inépcia, em projetos paroquiais ou em ladroagem. Num fundo comum, o emprego dos recursos fica mais visível. Tal sugestão é, óbvio, de um ingenuidade tola. Estados, seus senadores e deputados, farão o possível para tirar sua casquinha do ouro negro".
quarta-feira, 17 de março de 2010
quarta-feira, 3 de março de 2010
Carta aos investidores de Warren Buffett
Foi publicado hoje o relatório do BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC para seus investidores. É uma carta pública, longa e que mostra seus princípios para administrar dinheiro.
Peguei apenas um trecho, mas mostra a seriedade do Warren Buffet no trato do assunto. Além de um modo peculiar e simples de analisar negócios. Prof Ramiro - ramirogon@uol.com.br.
Long ago, Charlie laid out his strongest ambition: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll
never go there.” That bit of wisdom was inspired by Jacobi, the great Prussian mathematician, who counseled
“Invert, always invert” as an aid to solving difficult problems. (I can report as well that this inversion approach
works on a less lofty level: Sing a country song in reverse, and you will quickly recover your car, house and
wife.)
Here are a few examples of how we apply Charlie’s thinking at Berkshire:
• Charlie and I avoid businesses whose futures we can’t evaluate, no matter how exciting their
products may be. In the past, it required no brilliance for people to foresee the fabulous growth
that awaited such industries as autos (in 1910), aircraft (in 1930) and television sets (in 1950). But
the future then also included competitive dynamics that would decimate almost all of the
companies entering those industries. Even the survivors tended to come away bleeding.
Just because Charlie and I can clearly see dramatic growth ahead for an industry does not mean
we can judge what its profit margins and returns on capital will be as a host of competitors battle
for supremacy. At Berkshire we will stick with businesses whose profit picture for decades to
come seems reasonably predictable. Even then, we will make plenty of mistakes.
• We will never become dependent on the kindness of strangers. Too-big-to-fail is not a fallback
position at Berkshire. Instead, we will always arrange our affairs so that any requirements for cash
we may conceivably have will be dwarfed by our own liquidity. Moreover, that liquidity will be
constantly refreshed by a gusher of earnings from our many and diverse businesses.
When the financial system went into cardiac arrest in September 2008, Berkshire was a supplier
of liquidity and capital to the system, not a supplicant. At the very peak of the crisis, we poured
$15.5 billion into a business world that could otherwise look only to the federal government for
help. Of that, $9 billion went to bolster capital at three highly-regarded and previously-secure
American businesses that needed – without delay – our tangible vote of confidence. The remaining
$6.5 billion satisfied our commitment to help fund the purchase of Wrigley, a deal that was
completed without pause while, elsewhere, panic reigned.
Peguei apenas um trecho, mas mostra a seriedade do Warren Buffet no trato do assunto. Além de um modo peculiar e simples de analisar negócios. Prof Ramiro - ramirogon@uol.com.br.
Long ago, Charlie laid out his strongest ambition: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll
never go there.” That bit of wisdom was inspired by Jacobi, the great Prussian mathematician, who counseled
“Invert, always invert” as an aid to solving difficult problems. (I can report as well that this inversion approach
works on a less lofty level: Sing a country song in reverse, and you will quickly recover your car, house and
wife.)
Here are a few examples of how we apply Charlie’s thinking at Berkshire:
• Charlie and I avoid businesses whose futures we can’t evaluate, no matter how exciting their
products may be. In the past, it required no brilliance for people to foresee the fabulous growth
that awaited such industries as autos (in 1910), aircraft (in 1930) and television sets (in 1950). But
the future then also included competitive dynamics that would decimate almost all of the
companies entering those industries. Even the survivors tended to come away bleeding.
Just because Charlie and I can clearly see dramatic growth ahead for an industry does not mean
we can judge what its profit margins and returns on capital will be as a host of competitors battle
for supremacy. At Berkshire we will stick with businesses whose profit picture for decades to
come seems reasonably predictable. Even then, we will make plenty of mistakes.
• We will never become dependent on the kindness of strangers. Too-big-to-fail is not a fallback
position at Berkshire. Instead, we will always arrange our affairs so that any requirements for cash
we may conceivably have will be dwarfed by our own liquidity. Moreover, that liquidity will be
constantly refreshed by a gusher of earnings from our many and diverse businesses.
When the financial system went into cardiac arrest in September 2008, Berkshire was a supplier
of liquidity and capital to the system, not a supplicant. At the very peak of the crisis, we poured
$15.5 billion into a business world that could otherwise look only to the federal government for
help. Of that, $9 billion went to bolster capital at three highly-regarded and previously-secure
American businesses that needed – without delay – our tangible vote of confidence. The remaining
$6.5 billion satisfied our commitment to help fund the purchase of Wrigley, a deal that was
completed without pause while, elsewhere, panic reigned.
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